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We investigate the relation between the behavior of non-deterministic systems under fair-
ness constraints, and the behavior of probabilistic systems. To this end, ﬁrst a framework
based on computable stopping strategies is developed that provides a common foundation
for describing both fair and probabilistic behavior. On the basis of stopping strategies it is
then shown that fair behavior corresponds in a precise sense to random behavior in the
sense of Martin-Löf’s deﬁnition of randomness.
We view probabilistic systems as concrete implementations of more abstract non-
deterministic systems. Under this perspective the question is investigatedwhat probabilis-
tic properties are needed in such an implementation to guarantee (with probability one)
certain required fairnessproperties in thebehavior of theprobabilistic system.Generalizing
earlier concepts of -bounded transition probabilities,we introduce the notion of divergent
probabilistic systems,which enables anexact characterizationof the fairness properties of a
probabilistic implementation. Looking beyond pure fairness properties, we also investigate
what other qualitative system properties are guaranteed by probabilistic implementations
of fair non-deterministic behavior. This leads to a completeness result which generalizes a
well-known theorem by Pnueli and Zuck.
© 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The concept of fairness has been introduced in the study of non-deterministic systems as a means to eliminate from
the analysis of the system certain pathological behaviors. Fair behavior of a non-deterministic system is closely related
to the (almost surely) expected behavior of a probabilistic system: if one replaces the non-deterministic transitions in a
non-deterministic system by a probability distribution over the possible successor states, then one ﬁnds that the resulting
probabilistic system will show a fair behavior with probability one [1].
In fact, right from the beginning, some authors have viewed fairness conditions as a qualitative approximation to prob-
abilistic behavior [2,3]. De Alfaro [4] has proposed to deﬁne fairness as a probabilistic concept altogether (probabilistic
fairness).
Goal of this paper is to obtain a better understanding of the exact relationship between non-deterministic systems
under fairness constraints, and probabilistic systems. Our ﬁrst result is of a mostly conceptual, theoretical nature: we show
(Section 2.3) that there exists an exact correspondence between system behaviors that satisfy certain fairness conditions,
and system behaviors that are random in the classic sense of Martin-Löf [5–7]. More speciﬁcally, this result shows that
for any given set of fairness constraints there exists a probabilistic system whose behavior will exhibit with probability
one exactly the speciﬁed fairness properties. However, in this result the existence of such a probabilistic system is shown
in a non-constructive manner, and therefore provides little guidance for the practical design of probabilistic systems with
the desired fairness properties. The question of how a probabilistic system has to be designed in order to implement a
E-mail address: jaeger@cs.aau.dk
0890-5401/$ - see front matter © 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ic.2009.01.005
910 M. Jaeger / Information and Computation 207 (2009) 909–922
given set of fairness conditions is investigated in Section 3. Our main result here establishes a necessary and sufﬁcient
condition for probabilistic implementations of given fairness conditions. Finally (Section 4), we investigate to what extent
the fact that a given probabilistic system implements a certain set of fairness conditions is sufﬁcient to ensure that the
probabilistic systemwill only exhibit properties that are logically implied by these fairness conditions. Results that establish
such a correspondence are known as completeness results [3,1], because they show that logical deductive ormodel-checking
techniques provide complete proof systems for deriving all probability one properties of a given probabilistic system. Our
main result here is a generic completeness result that generalizes Pnueli and Zuck’s [3] result that α-fairness is complete for
properties expressible in linear time temporal logic.
2. Fairness and randomness
We begin by setting up the formal framework in which we study fairness and randomness. We require system mod-
els for non-deterministic and probabilistic systems (Section 2.1), and a way to describe fair and random system behav-
iors, respectively (Sections 2.2 and 2.3). It can then be shown that fair and random behavior coincides in a precise way
(Theorem 2.13).
2.1. Non-deterministic and probabilistic systems
In previousworks, concepts of fairnesswereusually deﬁnedwith respect to particular types of (non-deterministic) system
models that incorporated some features of an intended application domain, especially concurrent systems [8–10]. For the
purpose of the present paper,we can take a very abstract view, and use themost basicmodel of a non-deterministic transition
system.
Deﬁnition 2.1. A non-deterministic transition system is a triple G = (S, S0, t), where S is a ﬁnite set of states, S0 ⊆ S is the
set of starting states, and t : S → 2S\∅ is a transition relation.
The following notations are used for state sequences of G: ω denotes the set of natural numbers, σ , σ ′, . . . denote
elements from Sω , and s , s ′, . . . elements from S*. The length of s ∈ S*is denoted | s |. The ith component of σ ∈ Sω (resp.
s ∈ S*of length at least i) is denoted σ [i] (s [i]). We also use σ [i, j] for the subsequence σ [i], σ [i + 1], . . . , σ [j]. For the
preﬁx σ [1, i] we simply write σi. Run(G) := {σ |σ [1] ∈ S0, σ [i + 1] ∈ t(σ [i])(i ∈ ω)} is the set of inﬁnite runs of G, and
Runﬁn(G) : {s | s [1] ∈ S0, s [i + 1] ∈ t(s [i])(i < | s |)} is the set of ﬁnite runs of G.
A non-deterministic system G can be transformed into a probabilistic system by deﬁning for each s ∈ S a probability
distribution on t(s). When these probabilities are interpreted as transition probabilities, then we obtain a (stationary)
Markov chain that deﬁnes a probability distribution on Sω . We will call such a Markov chain an implementation of G,
because it represents one way of turning the abstract non-deterministic model G into a concrete implementable system.
G can also be implemented by systems other than Markov chains: for example, one can use time and history dependent
transition probabilities, or, on the other hand, one can implement G using a ﬁxed deterministic transition policy. In all cases,
the implementation deﬁnes a probability distribution on Run(G) (in the case of a deterministic implementation this is a
degenerate distribution placing probability 1 on a single run σ ∈ Run(G)). Based on these considerations, we will in the
following identify probabilistic systems (with set of states S) with probability distributions on Sω .
The following standard deﬁnitions and notations pertain to probability distributions on Sω: for s ∈ S*with | s | = i we
denote with [s ] the cylinder set {σ ∈ Sω |σi = s }. This notation is extended to L ⊆ S*via [L] := ⋃{[s ] | s ∈ L}. Let A denote
the σ -algebra generated by the system {[s ] | s ∈ S*}. Throughout, we take (Sω ,A) to be the underlying probability space, and
useμ,μ′, . . . to denote probabilitymeasures on (Sω ,A). Usually, we speak loosely ofμ as a probabilitymeasure on Sω , when
formallyμ is meant to be a measure on (Sω ,A). To simplify notation, we express the probability of a set of sequences σ that
satisfy some condition c(σ ) as μ(c(σ )), rather than μ({σ |c(σ )}). All sets {σ |c(σ )} that we shall encounter can easily be
shown to be A-measurable.
We can now formally state:
Deﬁnition 2.2. A probabilistic system over a ﬁnite set of states S is a probability distribution μ on (Sω ,A). A probabilistic
system μ is called an implementation of a non-deterministic system G if μ(s ss′ | s s) = 0 for all s ∈ S*, s ∈ S and s′ ∈ t(s)1.
By Deﬁnitions 2.1 and 2.2, we have introduced extremely basic system models. As mentioned above, most previous
investigations of fairness concepts were conducted on the basis of more elaborate system models. For the fundamental
questions we are investigating, our simpliﬁedmodels are sufﬁcient, and avoid an unnecessary burden of notation and detail.
We will indicate in Section 5 how our results can be lifted to some more complex system models.
1 Obviously, onlydistributions satisfying certain computability conditions represent actually implementable systems, butwewill notmake this distinction
here.
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2.2. Non-deterministic systems: fairness
Numerous concepts of fairness have been proposed. These concepts broadly fall into two different categories. The ﬁrst
type of deﬁnition tries to directly capture the underlying intuition that in a fair computation “if a certain choice is possible
sufﬁciently often, then it is sufﬁciently often taken” [11]. Approaches to formalize this intuition at various levels of generality
include [9,1–3,12].
In all these deﬁnitions, the set of fair runs of a system is “large” in a topological sense. This has led to a second type of
fairness deﬁnitions, in which fairness conditions are directly expressed by topological characterizations [13–15].
Since it is our goal to elucidate the close connection between the two fundamental conceptual notions of fairness and
randomness, we follow the ﬁrst approach to formalizing fairness. Like Baier and Kwiatkowska [1], we introduce a rather
general framework for specifying fairness conditions of different strengths, which includes many previous more speciﬁc
fairness concepts as special instances. Our deﬁnition is based on an adaptation of the concept of stopping times as used in
the theory of stochastic processes. This approach is aimed atmaking transparent the connectionwith classical formalizations
of randomness.
Deﬁnition 2.3. Let S be a ﬁnite set. A stopping strategy for S is a computable function
τ : S*→ ω,
such that τ(s ) ≤ τ(s ′) when s is a preﬁx of s ′. The ith stopping time τ i is deﬁned for σ ∈ Sω by
τ i(σ ) := min
k
(τ (σk) ≥ i)) ∈ ω ∪ {∞},
using the convention min ∅ = ∞, i.e. τ i(σ ) = ∞ iff τ(σk) < i for all k. Similarly, for s ∈ S*:
τ i(s ) := min
k
(τ (s k) ≥ i)) ∈ {1, . . . , | s | } ∪ {∞}.
We denote with T (S) the set of all stopping strategies for S.
The underlying intuition behind the deﬁnition of a stopping strategy is that we read a sequence σ from left to right, and
at selected positions σ [k] increase an integer counter by some number. This process is equivalently modeled by τ , which
gives the current counter value when the preﬁx s of σ has been read, or by the τ i, which give the position of σ at which the
counter value exceeds i. It is not essential that we are able to increase the counter bymore than one at a single step, i.e. for all
that follows we might as well have imposed the additional restriction τ(s s) ≤ τ(s ) + 1 for all s ∈ S*, s ∈ S (or equivalently
τ i(σ ) < ∞ ⇒ τ i(σ ) /= τ i+1(σ ) for all σ , i). The more general deﬁnition is merely a matter of convenience.
When τ i(σ ) < ∞ then σ [τ i(σ )] ∈ S is deﬁned. In the following we simply write σ [τ i] for σ [τ i(σ )], and take equations
of the form σ [τ i] = s to stand for the conjunction “ τ i(σ ) < ∞ and σ [τ i] = s”. Similarly, s [τ i] = s means “τ i(s ) ≤ | s |
and s [τ i(s )] = s”. In a similar vein, we shortly write {τ i < ∞} for the set {σ |τ i(σ ) < ∞}.
In connection with stopping times we abbreviate “for inﬁnitely many i” with “i.o.” (inﬁnitely often).
Based on the notion of a stopping strategy, we deﬁne fairness as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.4. Let G be a non-deterministic transition systemwith states S, τ a stopping strategy for S, σ ∈ Sω . We say that
σ is (τ , G)-fair, if for all s ∈ S and s′ ∈ t(s):
σ [τ i] = s i.o. ⇒ σ [τ i, τ i + 1] = ss′ i.o. (1)
When T is a family of stopping strategies, we say that σ is (T , G)-fair if σ is (τ , G)-fair for all τ ∈ T .
In the preceding deﬁnition the fairness condition (1) is required for all possible transitions from s. Sometimes one may
want to impose such constraints only on a special subset of transitions. In our framework this corresponds to specifying for
each state s a subset tfair(s) ⊆ t(s), and requiring (1) only for s′ ∈ tfair(s). Our subsequent results can equally be developed in
such a generalized setting. For the sake of conceptual and notational simplicity, however, wewill notmake such a distinction
between t(s) and tfair(s).
Example 2.5 (Strong fairness). Let τs(s ) := | s |. Then τs is the strategy according to which one stops at every position of σ ,
The left hand side of (1) simply says that s appears inﬁnitely often in σ . Condition (1) for all s, s′ ∈ t(s), thus, is the condition
of strong fairness: every possible transition that is enabled inﬁnitely often, is taken inﬁnitely often.
Example 2.6 (α-Fairness). Let φ be a formula in linear time temporal logic (LTL) over the set S as propositional variables.
For s ∈ S*then the decidable satisfaction relation s |= φ is deﬁned, and the stopping strategy τφ(s ) := | {j ≤ | s | | s j |=
φ} | expresses the rule that we stop whenever the preﬁx currently read satisﬁes φ. Let Tα := {τφ |φ ∈ LTL over S}. Then
(Tα , G)-fairness is α-fairness as deﬁned by Pnueli and Zuck [3] (modulo the translation to our simpler system model).
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Example 2.7 (Regular fairness). Let A be a ﬁnite automaton over input alphabet S, and L(A) ⊆ S*the language recognized by
A. In analogy to the preceding example, deﬁne the stopping time τA by replacing the relation s |= φ with s ∈ L(A). Let Tr be
the set of such τA. The resulting concept of (Tr , G)-fairness is called regular fairness.
Example 2.8 (Computable fairness).The strongestpossible fairness condition inour framework is (T (S), G)-fairness,whichwe
also call computable fairness. This concept of fairness was originally introduced in [16] (in a slightly different but equivalent
way), and can be seen as the saturation of most previous fairness notions. The intuition behind computable fairness is
unpredictability: if a sequence does not satisfy (1) for some τ , s, s′, then an observer of the sequence can algorithmically
make inﬁnitely often a non-trivial and correct prediction on the behavior of the system by predicting that the next state will
not be s′ whenever τ stops at state s (more precisely, by starting tomake these predictions after the ﬁnitelymany occurrences
of σ [τ i, τ i+1] = ss′ have passed). These predictions are non-trivial in the sense that they exclude a possible successor state
of the current state. Computable fairness, now is the condition that a sequence is not algorithmically (partially) predictable
in this sense.
Note that (T , G)-fairness of σ does not imply that σ is actually in Run(G). Usually, however, we will only be interested in
those (T , G)-fair sequences that are also runs of G, for which we introduce the notation
FairRun(T , G) := {σ ∈ Run(G) |σ is (T , G)-fair}.
Depending on what kind of unknown or unspeciﬁed process is represented by the non-determinism in the system, a
more or less comprehensive fairness assumption will be appropriate: if, for instance, the non-determinism models the
policy of a scheduler that decides which of a number of concurrent processes is to make the next execution step, then a
condition like strong fairness might be appropriate, as it simply excludes policies in which the execution of some processes
will be stalled. A condition like computable fairness, on the other hand, would here be unreasonable, as it excludes perfectly
sensible policies that schedule processes in a systematic, and hence predictable, round-robin fashion. When, in contrast,
the non-deterministic system serves as an approximation for a probabilistic system, then the full condition of computable
fairness becomes reasonable under suitable assumptions on the true underlying probabilistic system. The nature of these
assumptions will be studied in Section 3.
As alreadymentioned, one importantmotivation for our speciﬁc formalization of fairness is to enable the comparisonwith
the classical concept of randomness [5]. This comparison is facilitated by focusing on a special type of stopping strategies,
which we now introduce.
The idea underlying the following deﬁnition is quite simple: given a stopping strategy τ , we can construct a new stopping
strategy by picking some k ∈ ω, s, s′ ∈ S and proceed as follows: read σ until the ﬁrst k occurrences of subsequences of the
form σ [τ i, τ i + 1] = ss′ have appeared, then stop whenever τ stops at the state s, but only until a further occurrence of
σ [τ i, τ i + 1] = ss′ appears. The deﬁnition of the resulting new stopping strategy τk,s,s′(s ) as a function on s ∈ S*then is
given as the number of times j that one has stoppedwhen reading s . The precise deﬁnition of the resulting stopping strategy
τk,s,s′ is as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.9. Let τ be a stopping strategy, k ∈ ω, s, s′ ∈ S. The (k, s, s′)-transform of τ is the stopping strategy τk,s,s′ deﬁned
as follows: τk,s,s′(s ) is the largest j ∈ ω such that there exist i0, i1 ∈ ω with
(a) | {i ≤ i0 | s [τ i, τ i + 1] = ss′} | = k.
(b) | {i0 < i ≤ i1 | s [τ i] = s} | = j.
(c) ∀i : i0 < i ≤ i1 − 1 : s [τ i, τ i + 1] /= ss′.
A set T ⊆ T (S) is said to be closed under τk,s,s′-transforms, if τ ∈ T implies τk,s,s′ ∈ T for all k, s, s′.
Stopping strategies of the form τk,s,s′ have some special properties that we will exploit in the following sections. Since
τk,s,s′ only stops at state s, one obtains as an immediate consequence of our deﬁnitions:
σ [τ i
k,s,s′ = s] ⇔ τ ik,s,s′(σ ) < ∞. (2)
Another immediate consequence from the deﬁnitions is that for all σ , G, and all k, s, s′ with s′ ∈ t(s):
σ is (τk,s,s′ , G)-fair ⇔ σ ∈ ∩∞i=1{τ ik,s,s′ < ∞}. (3)
The following lemma, which again follows directly from the deﬁnitions, shows that k, s, s′-transforms are in a sense
sufﬁcient.
Lemma 2.10. Let G be a non-deterministic transition system with states S, τ ∈ T (S), σ ∈ Sω. The following are
equivalent:
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(i) σ is (τ , G)-fair.
(ii) σ is (τk,s,s′ , G)-fair for all k ∈ ω, s ∈ S, s′ ∈ t(s).
Lemma 2.10 permits us to restrict attention to stopping strategies of the form τk,s,s′ wheneverwe are dealingwith a family
T ⊆ T (S) that is closed under k, s, s′-transforms. Most natural families have this property: for example, Tα , Tr and T (S) (cf.
Examples 2.6–2.8) can be shown to be closed under k, s, s′-transforms.
2.3. Probabilistic systems: randomness and fairness
The problem of how to distinguish random from non-random sequences has a long history. VonMises [17] was the ﬁrst to
propose a formal deﬁnition of randomness, which, however, was not fully consistent. Capturing the underlying intuition of
von Mises’s approach, Martin-Löf [5] provided a now classical deﬁnition of randomness. For related, alternative, deﬁnitions
see e.g. [6,18], and [19] for an overview.
The basic idea behind this deﬁnition is that a sequence σ is random (with regard to a given probability distribution μ) if
σ does not belong to an “exceptional” set C withμ(C) = 0. This idea cannot be directly used as a formal deﬁnition, because
typically one has μ({σ }) = 0 for all σ ∈ Sω , so that no random sequences would exist. For this reason, Martin-Löf restricts
the sets C under consideration to those for which membership σ ∈ C is testable by an effectively computable sequential
statistical test. Such tests can be deﬁned in several equivalent ways. In the followingwe give a deﬁnition in terms of stopping
strategies in the sense of Deﬁnition 2.3.
Deﬁnition 2.11. Letμ be a probabilitymeasure on Sω . A stopping strategy τ is called a test for μ ifμ(∩∞i=1{τ i < ∞}) = 0. A
sequence σ ∈ Sω is called (τ ,μ)-random, if τ is not a test forμ, or σ ∈ ∩∞i=1{τ i < ∞}. If T is a family of stopping strategies,
then σ is called (T ,μ)-random if σ is (τ ,μ)-random for all τ ∈ T .
Example 2.12. Let S = {0, 1}, and μ be the uniform distribution on Sω (i.e. μ([s ]) = 1/2| s | for all s ∈ S*). Let  > 0, and




s [j] > 1
2
+ } |.






























Since ﬁniteness of {i ∈ ω | 1
i
∑i
j=1 σ [j] > 12 + } is equivalent to σ ∈ ∩∞i=1{τ i < ∞}, one obtains that τ is a test forμ (for
any  > 0).
The notion of (T (S),μ)-randomness as given by Deﬁnition 2.11 is equivalent to Martin-Löf’s deﬁnition of randomness,
modulo the following two changes: in order to obtainMartin-Löf’s original concept, onewould have to restrict Deﬁnition 2.11
to computable μ, and replace the condition μ(∩∞i=1{τ i < ∞}) = 0 (which is equivalent to μ(τ i < ∞) → 0 for i → ∞)
with the stronger condition μ(τ i < ∞) < 1/2i (i ∈ ω). Both these modiﬁcations are instrumental for the construction of
a universal test of randomness, one of the main goals of Martin-Löf’s work. From the point of view of providing a natural
deﬁnition of randomness, however, the more general notion of a test as given in Deﬁnition 2.11 seems to be rather more
appropriate than the one used by Martin-Löf; it has previously also been adopted by Gaifman and Snir [7].
On the basis of the common foundation in terms of stopping strategies for fairness and randomness, we can now establish
an exact correspondence between these two notions.
Theorem 2.13. Let G be a non-deterministic transition system with states S; let T ⊆ T (S). There exists a probability measure μ˜
such that for all σ ∈ Sω : σ is (T , G)-fair iff σ is (T (S), μ˜)-random.
Proof: Deﬁne M := {μ |μ((T , G)-fair) = 1}. A stopping strategy τ is called a test for M, if τ is a test for all μ ∈ M. Let
τ1, τ2, . . . be the (ﬁnite or countably inﬁnite) set of stopping strategies in T that are not tests for M. For each j ∈ ω let
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μj ∈ M be such thatμj(∩∞i=1{τ ij < ∞}) > 0, and deﬁne μ˜ =
∑∞
j=1 1/2jμj . The constructed μ˜ has the following property:
a stopping strategy τ is a test for M iff τ is a test for μ˜.
Now consider σ ∈ Sω , and assume that σ is (T (S), μ˜)-random. To show that σ is (T , G)-fair it is sufﬁcient to show
that σ ∈ ∩∞i=1{τ ik,s,s′ < ∞} for any k, s, s′-transform of any τ ∈ T (Lemma 2.10 and (3)). Let τ , k, s, s′ be given. For any
μ ∈ M, by deﬁnition of M and Lemma 2.10, then μ((τk,s,s′ , G)-fair) = 1, and hence μ(∩∞i=1{τ ik,s,s′ < ∞}) = 0. Then also
μ˜(∩∞i=1{τ ik,s,s′ < ∞}) = 0, i.e. τk,s,s′ is a test for μ˜. (T (S), μ˜)-randomness of σ now implies σ ∈ ∩∞i=1{τ ik,s,s′ < ∞}, as
required.
For the converse direction, assume that σ is (T , G)-fair. Let σ denote the point mass on σ , i.e. the probability distribution
that assigns probability 1 to every set that contains σ . Then σ ∈M. Let τ ∈T (S) be a test for μ˜. Then τ also is a test for M,
andhence forσ , so thatσ (∩∞i=1{τ i < ∞})=0.Bydeﬁnitionofσ , now,σ ∈ ∩∞i=1{τ i < ∞}, i.e.σ is (T (S), μ˜)-random. 
It is important to note that the equivalence in Theorem 2.13 is between (T , G)-fairness and (T (S),μ)-randomness, and
not between (T , G)-fairness and (T ,μ)-randomness. Thus, fairness is shown to be equivalent to randomness in the full
sense of Martin-Löf [5], and not only equivalent to a weakened form of randomness, determined by only the subset T of
stopping strategies. The class T of stopping strategies deﬁning the fairness concept under consideration only inﬂuences the
construction of the probability measure μ˜.
3. Probabilistic fairness guarantees
Probabilistic implementations of a non-deterministic system will typically possess quite general fairness guarantees.
This has especially been noted for Markov chain implementations [1]. Theorem 2.13 establishes an exact correspondence
between fairness and probabilistic behavior. In particular, the theorem shows that for every fairness concept T there exists
a probabilistic implementation μ˜ that guarantees (T , G)-fairness with probability one. However, μ˜ is obtained in a non-
constructive manner in the proof of Theorem 2.13, and is not even guaranteed to be computable. In this section we take a
more constructive approach to the question of how to obtain probabilistic implementations of certain fairness properties
(or, conversely, what fairness properties will be guaranteed by a given implementation). Our interest in this section is
mostly with probabilistic systems that are not Markov chains, and therefore may not readily be seen to possess the required
fairness properties. The main probabilistic concept needed in the investigation of such systems is given in the following
deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3.1. Let G be a non-deterministic transition system, τ a stopping strategy, and μ a probability measure on Sω .
We say that μ is (τ , G)-divergent, if for all s ∈ S and s′ ∈ t(s):




μ(σ [τ i + 1] = s′ |σ [τ i] = s) = ∞, (4)
(note that μ(σ [τ i] = s i.o.) > 0 implies that μ(σ [τ i] = s) > 0 for inﬁnitely many i, but not vice versa). If T is a family of
stopping strategies, then μ is called (T , G)-divergent if μ is (τ , G)-divergent for all τ ∈ T .
Lemma 3.2. Let G be a non-deterministic transition system, s, s′ ∈ S with s′ ∈ t(s). Let τ ∈ T (S) and k ∈ ω. Then
μ((τk,s,s′ , G)-fair) = 1 ⇔ μ is (τk,s,s′ , G)-divergent. (5)
Proof: For τk,s,s′ we have by (2) and (3)
σ is (τk,s,s′ , G)-fair ⇔ not σ [τ ik,s,s′ ] = s i.o.
The left to right direction of the theorem directly follows, because μ((τk,s,s′ , G)-fair) = 1 makes (4) vacuously true with
μ(σ [τ i
k,s,s′ ] = s˜ i.o.) = 0 for all s˜ ∈ S.
For the converse direction, assume that (4) holds for τk,s,s′ . We need to show that μ(σ [τ ik,s,s′ ] = s i.o.) = 0. Assume
otherwise, i.e.μ(σ [τ i
k,s,s′ ] = s i.o.) = r > 0. This impliesμ(σ [τ ik,s,s′ ] = s) ≥ r for all i.With {τ i+1k,s,s′ < ∞} ⊆ {τ ik,s,s′ < ∞} ∩
{τ i+1
k,s,s′ = s′}c , and using (2), it follows that:
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μ(σ [τ i
k,s,s′ + 1] = s′ |σ [τ ik,s,s′ ] = s) ≤ μ(τ i+1k,s,s′ = ∞|τ ik,s,s′ < ∞)
= μ(τ
i





k,s,s′ < ∞, τ i+1k,s,s′ = ∞)
r .
Summing over all i, we obtain ∞ on the left hand side and (1 − r)/r on the right hand side, a contradiction. 
The following example shows that (5) does not hold for arbitrary stopping strategies τ .
Example 3.3. Let G be a non-deterministic coin-tossing model: G = ({H, T}, {H, T}, t) with t(H) = t(T) = {H, T}. Consider
the following probabilistic implementations of G: μ1, the point mass on Hω (modeling a bogus coin with heads on both
sides), μ2, the uniform distribution on {H, T}ω (modeling a fair coin), and μ := 1/2(μ1 + μ2), a mixture of μ1 and μ2.
Deﬁne τ(s ) := | {i ≤ | s | | s [i] = H} |, i.e. τ stops at every occurrence of H. Then μ is (τ , G)-divergent, because for all i:
μ(σ [τ i] = H) = 1,
μ(σ [τ i+1] = T |σ [τ i] = H) = 1/2(μ1(σ [τ i+1] = T) + μ2(σ [τ i+1] = T)) = 1/2(0 + 1/2),
and μ(σ [τ i+1] = H |σ [τ i] = H) = 1/2(1 + 1/2).
On the other hand, we have that
μ((τ , G)-fair) = 1/2(μ1((τ , G)-fair) + μ2((τ , G)-fair)) = 1/2(0 + 1) = 1/2.
Hence (5) does not hold for T = {τ }.
Even though (5) does not hold “pointwise” for arbitrary τ , we show by the following theorem that this equivalence can
be extended to most relevant classes of stopping strategies.
Theorem 3.4. Let T ⊆ T (S) be closed under k, s, s′-transforms. Then
μ((T , G)-fair) = 1 iff μ is (T , G)-divergent.
Proof: “⇐”: Since T is countable, we have that μ((T , G)-fair) = 1 is equivalent to μ((τ , G)-fair) = 1 for all τ ∈ T . By
Lemma 2.10 the latter is equivalentμ((τk,s,s′ , G)-fair) = 1 for all k, s, s′-transforms of τ ∈ T . Using Lemma 3.2 and the closure
of T under k, s, s′-transforms, this is implied by the (T , G)-divergence of μ.
“⇒”: Assume thatμ is not (T , G)-divergent, i.e. there exists τ ∈ T withμ(σ [τ i] = s i.o.) = r > 0 and∑μ(σ [τ i + 1] =
s′ |σ [τ i] = s) < ∞. As μ(σ [τ i, τ i + 1] = ss′) ≤ μ(σ [τ i + 1] = s′ |σ [τ i] = s), we have by the ﬁrst Borel-Cantelli lemma
(e.g. [20, Theorem 4.3]) that μ(σ [τ i, τ i + 1] = ss′ i.o.) = 0. Thus 1 − r ≥ μ((τ , G)-fair) ≥ μ((T , G)-fair). 
When μ is an implementation of G with μ((T , G)-fair) = 1, then we also say that μ is a (T , G)-fair implementation of G.
Theorem 3.4 provides an exact characterization of (T , G)-fair implementations of G, provided T has the required closure
property. For T not closed under k, s, s′-transforms, still the left-to-right implication of Theorem 3.4 holds, i.e. one obtains a
necessary probabilistic condition for μ being a (T , G)-fair implementations of G. As Example 3.3 illustrates, it may then not
be a sufﬁcient one. This limitation of Theorem3.4 does not appear to be a very serious one, as closure under k, s, s′-transforms
is a rather natural property for classes of stopping strategies.
Example 3.5 (Markov chains). Let G be a non-deterministic transition system. Deﬁne a Markov chain on G by assigning to
every s ∈ S0 a starting probability p0(s), and to every pair s, s′ with s′ ∈ t(s) a transition probability p(s, s′) > 0, such that∑
s′∈t(s) p(s, s′) = 1. Letμ be the probability distribution deﬁned by the Markov chain on Sω . Thenμ is (T (S), G)-divergent.
A slight generalization is obtained by allowing non-stationary Markov chains with -bounded transition probabilities: here
the transition probabilities are deﬁned separately in the form pi(s, s
′) for each time point i ∈ ω. If the pi(s, s′) satisfy a global
lower bound pi(s, s
′) ≥  > 0, then the induced distribution μ is (T (S), G)-divergent, and hence μ((τ , G)-fair) = 1 for all
τ . This is essentially Theorem 1 of Baier and Kwiatkowska [1] (with the difference that Baier and Kwiatkowska considered
-bounds for transitions in a stationary inﬁnite state Markov chain, whereas here we consider non-stationary ﬁnite state
Markov chains).
Finally, one can even omit the condition that transition probabilities are Markovian, and deﬁne for each s ∈ Runﬁn(G)
ending with s, and s′ ∈ t(s) transition probabilities p(s , s′). If all these transition probabilities satisfy a global lower bound
p(s , s′) > , then the induced distribution μ still is (T (S), G)-divergent.
Example 3.6. Let G,μ and τ be as in Example 3.3. Let T be the closure of {τ } under k, s, s′-transforms. Then μ is not (T , G)-
divergent. To see this, consider the stopping strategy τ˜ := τ0,H,T . This strategy consists of stopping at every H until the ﬁrst
T appears.
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Wethenhaveσ [τ˜ i] = H inﬁnitely often iffσ = Hω , andhenceμ(σ [τ˜ i] = H i.o.) = 1/2. Also, for every i ∈ ω:μ(σ [τ˜ i] =
H) > 0 and
μ(σ [τ˜ i+1] = T |σ [τ˜ i] = H) = μ(σ [τ˜ i+1] = T | τ˜ i < ∞)
= μ1(σ [τ˜ i+1] = T, τ˜ i < ∞) + μ2(σ [τ˜ i+1] = T, τ˜ i < ∞)
μ1(τ˜
i < ∞) + μ2(τ˜ i < ∞) =
0 + (1/2)i+1
1 + (1/2)i ≤ (1/2)
i+1.
Thus, the deﬁning condition (4) of (τ , G)-divergence does not hold for τ˜ , s = H, and s′ = T.
The following more elaborate example gives an application of Theorem 3.4 in a situation where no global -bound on
transition probabilities can be given.
Example 3.7. Consider a salesclerk who has to serve customers arriving at two different counters c, c′. The salesclerk needs
a constant time unit to serve one customer. While serving a customer, new customers arrive randomly and independently at
the two counters. Assume that the number of customers arriving at counters c, c′ during the ith time unit is given by random
variables ni, n
′
i , whose distributions ν , ν
′ do not depend on i. Let 0 < λ, λ′ < ∞ be the expected values of ν , respectively, ν′.
Assume that the salesclerk uses a randomized strategy to decide which counter to serve in the next time unit: if p, p′
denote, respectively, the number of people currently waiting at counters c, c′, then the clerk will next serve counter c with
probability p/(p + p′). One can easily see that in an idealized, deterministic version of this scenario, this will be the strategy
that ensures that customers arriving in the same time unit will have towait approximately equally long. For our probabilistic
model, we would like to prove a much weaker fairness property, namely, that with probability one all customers arriving at
either of the two counters will be served eventually. The intuitive reason why this is the case is the following: disregarding
for a moment that customers also leave the queues after being served, we obtain from the strong law of large numbers that
with probability one the number of peoplewaiting at the two counters will show an approximately linear growthwith linear
coefﬁcients λ, λ′. This means that the probability that c will be served next is approximately λ/(λ + λ′) at every point in
time, and thus, with probability one, c will be chosen inﬁnitely often. Taking the departure of customers into account, we
obtain as a lower bound for the number of customers waiting at c a linear growth with coefﬁcient max{0, λ − 1} (note that
λ − 1 is the growth rate at counter c if c is always chosen for service). Assuming thatλ > 1,we still obtain a nonzero constant
lower bound (λ − 1)/(λ − 1 + λ′) for the selection probability of c. In the following, we will use Theorem 3.4 to turn this
intuitive reasoning for the case λ > 1, λ′ > 1 into a rigorous proof.
Our scenario is naturally modeled as a Markov chain over state space S+ = {c, c′} × ω × ω, where (c, k, k′) represents
the state that in the current time unit counter c is being served, and at the end of the current time unit k and k′ customers are
waiting at counters c, respectively c′. The transition probability from e.g. (c, k, k′) to (c′, l, l′) then is given by k′/(k + k′)ν(l −
k)ν′(l′ − k′ + 1). Letμ denote the probability distribution on (S+)ω induced by thisMarkov chain. Sincewe are here dealing
with an inﬁnite state Markov chain whose transition probabilities are not -bounded in the sense of Example 3.5, none of
our results so far directly apply. However, for the analysis of our fairness condition we are only interested in the question
whether a state sequence generated by the Markov chain will contain both inﬁnitely many states of the form (c, ·, ·) and
(c′, ·, ·). Relevant to our question, thus, is the marginal distribution induced by μ on sequences over S = {c, c′}. We denote
this distribution by μ¯. Formally, for any ﬁnite sequence (c1, . . . , cn) ∈ S*:









1), . . . , (cn, kn, k
′
n)).
The precise question, now, is whether μ¯((Tstrong , G)-fair) = 1, where G is the transition system over S with t(c) =
t(c′) = {c, c′}. We will actually show the much stronger result that μ¯((T (S), G)-fair) = 1. Since T (S) is closed under
k, s, s′-transforms, we obtain this result by showing that (4) holds for k, s, s′-transforms in T (S).
Let Ni := ∑ij=1 nj , N′i :=
∑i
j=1 n′j be the random variables representing the total number of customers that have arrived
at the two counters up to and including time unit i. At time step i the underlyingMarkov chain then is in state (·, k, k′), where
k (k′) is Ni (N′i ) minus the number of times c (c′) was served. By the strong law of large numbers we have that for every
 > 0: μ(limiNi/i ∈ [λ − , λ + ]) = 1, and similarly for N′i (note that the Ni can be retrieved from the state sequence in
S+, so that μ really speciﬁes these probabilities). Choose  > 0 with λ − 1 −  > 0 and λ′ − 1 −  > 0.
Now let τ be a k, s, s′-transforms in T (S). For concreteness’ sake, assume that τ has the form τk,c,c′ . To show (4) assume
that μ(σ [τ i] = c i.o.) = r > 0 (otherwise we are done). This implies μ(σ [τ i] = c) ≥ r for all i. Now:
μ¯(σ [τ i + 1] = c′ |σ [τ i] = c)≥μ(σ [τ i + 1] = c′ |σ [τ i] = c, |Nτ i/τ i − λ | < , |N′τ i/τ i − λ′ | < )
·μ(|Nτ i/τ i − λ | < , |N′τ i/τ i − λ′ | <  |σ [τ i] = c). (6)
First consider the ﬁrst factor on the right hand side of (6). |Nτ i/τ i − λ | <  and |N′τ i/τ i − λ′ | <  imply that the
Markov chain at time τ i is in a state (c, k, k′), where k′ ≥ N′
τ i
− τ i ≥ (λ′ − 1 − )τ i, and k ≤ Nτ i − 1 ≤ (λ + )τ i. Then
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k′/(k + k′) ≥ (λ′ − 1 − )/(λ′ − 1 + λ). Since λ′ − 1 −  > 0 this gives a strictly positive lower bound for the ﬁrst factor.
Turning to the second factor, we obtain from τ i ≥ i that
{ |Nτ i/τ i − λ | < , |N′τ i/τ i − λ′ | < } ⊇ ∩k≥i{ |Nk/k − λ | < , |N′k/k − λ′ | < }.
For i → ∞ the probability of the intersection on the right converges to 1, and, hence, so does the probability of the set on
the left. Because of the uniform lower bound r for μ(σ [τ i] = c), we obtain that the second factor in (6) converges to 1 as
i → ∞. Combining the result for the two factors, we obtain that the right hand side of (6) is bounded frombelow by a strictly
positive constant as i → ∞, and hence gives ∞ when summed over all i.
4. Completeness
In the previous sections, we have investigated under what conditions a probabilistic system will satisfy certain fairness
conditions. However, fairness conditions are usually not the ﬁnal goal, but only ameans to establish the properties of ultimate
interest, e.g. program termination [9]. Termination can be represented in our simpliﬁed system model by a designated goal
state g ∈ S, i.e. a run σ ∈ Sω is terminating iff σ [i] = g for some i. Thus, we can deﬁne the set of all terminating runs of
system G:
Cterm := {σ ∈ Run(G) |∃i : σ [i] = g}.
Thequestion ofwhether a certain fairness assumption T ⊆ T (S) guarantees termination forG then is the question ofwhether
the inclusion
FairRun(T , G) ⊆ Cterm, (7)
is valid. When μ is a probabilistic implementation of G with
μ(FairRun(T , G)) = 1, (8)
then (7) implies
μ(Cterm) = 1. (9)
Conversely, (8) and (9) together will, in general, not imply (7), because (9) may hold only because of some special features of
the probabilistic system μ. For some other (T , G)-fair implementation of G then perhaps μ˜(Cterm) /= 1, which, in particular,
precludes FairRun(T , G) ⊆ Cterm.
A problem of considerable interest, now, is to identify certain classes of properties C, fairness conditions T , and (T , G)-fair
implementations μ of G, such that, in fact
μ(C) = 1 ⇔ FairRun(T , G) ⊆ C. (10)
When this equivalence holds, then logic-based and probabilistic methods for veriﬁcation can be used interchangeably for
property C: the inclusion on the right-hand side of (10) represents a veriﬁcation problem for the non-deterministic system
G, whichwould usually be solved by theorem proving ormodel checking techniques.Whenμ is a (T , G)-fair implementation
of G for which (10) holds, then one can alternatively use probabilistic methods to show thatμ(C) = 1. Conversely, when we
are given a probabilistic systemμ, then the left-hand side of (10) expresses a probabilistic veriﬁcation problem forμ. When
μ is known to be a (T , G)-fair implementation of G, such that (10) holds, then logic-based methods can be used to solve the
probabilistic veriﬁcation problem. Because of this latter perspective, an equivalence of the form (10) is called a completeness
result [3,1] (logic-based methods are complete for probabilistic veriﬁcation).
Our goal is to identify classes of probabilistic systemsM, classes of properties C ⊆ 2Sω , and fairness conditions T ⊆ T (S),
such that (10) holds for all μ ∈ M, C ∈ C, and T . The classical result of this type is Pnueli and Zuck’s [3] theorem that (10)
holds when C is the class of all LTL-deﬁnable properties, M is the class of Markov chains on G (cf. Example 3.5), and T is the
condition of α-fairness (cf. Example 2.6) (again adapting Pnueli and Zuck’s result to our simpler system models).
Observe thatwhen (10) can be shown to hold for allμ froma certain classM, then this also entails an important robustness
property of C: sinceμ does not appear on the right-hand side of (10), one obtains thatμ(C) = 1 holds either for allμ ∈ M,
or for no μ ∈ M.
Let us denote by
MFR(T ,G) := {μ |μ(FairRun(T , G))) = 1},
the set of (T , G)-fair implementations of G. When μ ∈ MFR(T ,G), then the right-to-left implication of (10) is trivial. Further-
more, when FairRun(T , G) ∈ C, then (10) can only hold when μ ∈ MFR(T ,G). In the previous sections we obtained tools for
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decidingwhether a givenμ is amember ofMFR(T ,G). In the present section, therefore,wewill focus on classesM ⊆ MFR(T ,G),
and the left-to-right implication of (10), the converse then being trivial. Furthermore, our main result will refer to ﬁnite
automata both for the deﬁnition of the class C, and for the fairness condition T . In the following subsection we summarize
some well-known facts about inﬁnitary languages C deﬁned by ﬁnite automata.
4.1. Inﬁnitary languages
We write A = (S, Z , z0, r, Zacc) for a deterministic ﬁnite automaton with input alphabet S, set of states Z , initial state z0,
transition function r, and set of accepting states Zacc ⊆ Z . We assume that r is deterministic, but possibly incomplete, i.e. it
is a partial function from Z × S to Z . We refer to an automaton with input alphabet S as an S-automaton.
An inﬁnite input string σ ∈ Sω induces a ﬁnite or inﬁnite state sequence ζ ∈ Z∗∪ Zω , depending on whether σ leads to
a transition not deﬁned by r. We denote with infA(σ ) ⊆ Z the (possibly empty) set of states that occur inﬁnitely often in ζ .
A ﬁnite automaton is turned into a Muller automaton by replacing Zacc with a set Z ⊆ 2Z . A sequence σ ∈ Sω is accepted
by the Muller automaton if infA(σ ) ∈ Z .
When A1, A2 are two S-automata, then their product A1 × A2 is deﬁned as usual. When in the sequel we speak of a class
A of automata, it is always taken for granted thatA is deﬁned by conditions on the set of states Z and the transition function
r only, i.e. it is closed under redeﬁnitions of the set of accepting states.
From any ﬁnitary language L ⊆ S*an inﬁnitary language −→L is obtained by
−→
L := {σ ∈ Sω |σi ∈ L i.o.}.
When A is a class of ﬁnite automata that is closed under products, then the following are equivalent for  ⊆ Sω (cf. [21,
Lemma 4.3]):
(a)  is accepted by some A ∈ A with a Muller acceptance condition.
(b)  is a Boolean combination of sets of the form
−→
L(A) with A ∈ A.
(c)  = ∪ki=1(−−→L(Ai) ∩ Sω\−−→L(Bi)) for some k ∈ ω, and Ai, Bi ∈ A.
Finally, we associate with a non-deterministic transition system G with state set S the ﬁnite automaton AG = (S, S ∪{start}, start, r, S), where start is a state not in S, and r(s, s′) = s′ if either s = start and s′ ∈ S0, or s ∈ S and s′ ∈ t(s). Then
AG accepts Runﬁn(G). Replacing S with Z := 2S\∅ yields a Muller automaton that accepts Run(G).
4.2. Main result
Suppose we are given a class of properties C, and a fairness condition T , and now want to determine as large as possible
a class M ⊆ MFR(T ,G), such that (10) holds for all μ ∈ M. As the following example shows, it is in general not possible to
obtain (10) for all μ ∈ MFR(T ,G).
Example 4.1. Let S, G be as in Example 3.3. Let T be the condition of regular fairness (Example 2.7), and C the class of ω-
regular properties (i.e. both T and C are deﬁned by the class of all ﬁnite automata). FairRun(T , G) contains both sequences
starting with H and sequences starting with T. Let σ ∈ FairRun(T , G) with σ [1] = H. Let σ be the unit probability point
mass on σ . Then σ ∈ MFR(T ,G), and for C = HSω ∈ C: σ (C) = 1, but FairRun(T , G) ⊆ C.
Theprobabilistic systemσ in theprecedingexampledidnot satisfy (10)because itpossessedsomevery speciﬁcproperties
not shared by other (T , G)-fair implementations ofG. These speciﬁc properties here derived from the fact that σ is ameasure
that is highly concentrated on a small subset (indeed a singleton) of runs. This motivates the following deﬁnition, which
allows us to exclude such highly concentrated measures.
Deﬁnition 4.2. Let G be a transition system, T a set of stopping strategies,μ a probability distribution on Sω . We say thatμ
has support FairRun(T , G), if μ ∈ MFR(T ,G), and μ([s ]) > 0 for all s ∈ Runﬁn(G).
We can now formulate our completeness result.
Theorem 4.3. Let A be a class of S-automata that is closed under products, and contains the automaton AG for every transition
system G with state set S. Let T = {τA |A ∈ A}. Let C be the class of all Boolean combinations of sets of the form−→L(A)with A ∈ A.
Then (10) holds for all transition systems G with state set S, all C ∈ C, and all μ that have support FairRun(T , G).
Before turning to the proof, we point out two interesting special cases of the theorem: when A is the class of counter
free S-automata, then the class C deﬁned in the theorem is just the class of LTL-deﬁnable properties (with S as the set of
propositional variables; cf. [22, Theorem 6.7]), and T is the condition of α-fairness. Thus we regain the completeness result
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of Pnueli and Zuck [3]. When A is the class of all ﬁnite S-automata, then C is the class of ω-regular properties, and T is the
condition of regular fairness (Example 2.7).
Proof of Theorem 4.3: The right to left direction of (10) trivially holds by the condition thatμ has support FairRun(T , G). For
the left to right direction, let A = (S, Z , z0, r,Z) be the Muller automaton that accepts C. We show that for σ ∈ FairRun(T , G)
then U := infA(σ ) has positive probability, i.e.
μ({σ ′ | infA(σ ′) = U}) > 0. (11)
From μ(C) = 1 it then follows that U must be an accepting set of states, and hence σ ∈ C.
To show (11), let GA := AG × A be the product of AG and A. We show that for a set V ⊆ (S ∪ {start}) × Z of states in GA
the following are equivalent:
(i) V = infGA(σ ) for some σ ∈ FairRun(T , G).
(ii) V is a terminal strongly connected component (tscc) in GA that is reachable from the initial state by some s ∈ Runﬁn(G).
(iii) μ({σ ′ | infGA(σ ′) = V}) > 0.
(i)⇒(ii): Let σ ∈ FairRun(T , G) with infGA(σ ) = V . V is a strongly connected component of GA by deﬁnition, so it only
needs to be shown that V is terminal. Assume otherwise. Then there exists a state (s, z) in V from which a state (s′, z′) ∈ V
is reachable by a transition labeled with s′. In particular, then s′ ∈ t(s) in G. Turn GA into a deterministic ﬁnite automaton
by deﬁning (s, z) to be its only accepting state. GA belongs to A, and hence τGA ∈ T . Furthermore σ [τ iGA] = s for inﬁnitely
many i, but σ [τ iGA, τ iGA + 1] = ss′ for at most ﬁnitely many i, a contradiction.
(ii)⇒(iii): Let s be as given in (ii). Then
[s ] ∩ Run(G) = {σ |∅ /= infGA(σ ) ⊆ V} ⊇ [s ] ∩ FairRun(T , G).
Fromμ having support FairRun(T , G) it follows thatμ({σ |∅ /= infGA(σ ) ⊆ V} ∩ FairRun(T , G)) > 0. By the same argument
as above, {σ | infGA(σ )V} ∩ FairRun(T , G) = ∅, and (iii) follows.
(iii)⇒(i): From μ(FairRun(T , G)) = 1 it follows that μ({σ | infGA(σ ) = V} ∩ FairRun(T , G)) = μ({σ | infGA(σ ) = V}) >
0, and {σ | infGA(σ ) = V} ∩ FairRun(T , G) is nonempty.
From the implication (i)⇒(iii) now (11) follows, because for U = infA(σ ) and V = infGA(σ ) we have {σ ′ | infA(σ ′) =
U} ⊇ {σ ′ | infGA(σ ′) = V}, so that (11) follows from (iii). 
With the following corollary we extract from the proof of Theorem 4.3 the automata theoretic method for probabilistic
veriﬁcation [23,24]. In the formulation of the corollary we use TGA to denote the (ﬁnite) set of all stopping strategies τGA that
are obtainable from the automaton GA as deﬁned in the proof of Theorem 4.3 by various choices of accepting sets of states.
Corollary 4.4. Let C ⊆ Sω be recognized by a ﬁnite automaton A with states Z and Muller acceptance condition Z. Let μ be a
probability distribution on Sω such that the following holds: there exists a non-deterministic transition system G with states S such
that μ has support FairRun(TGA, G). Then the following are equivalent:
(a) μ(C) = 1.
(b) For all terminal strongly connected components V in GA that are reachable from the initial state by some s ∈ Runﬁn(G):
{z ∈ Z |∃s ∈ S : (s, z) ∈ V} ∈ Z.
Typically, the probabilistic system μ for which one wants to check the property C is given as a Markov chain. In this case
the transition system G required by the corollary is simply given by the nonzero transition probabilities. Then condition (b)
is effectively testable by constructing the automaton GA and checking its tscc’s for membership in Z .
Proof of Corollary 4.4: For ﬁxed C andμ as in the corollaryweobtain as in the proof of Theorem4.3 the equivalence (ii)⇔(iii)
(this is because only stopping strategies from TGA are needed in the proof). We have μ(C) = 1 iff for all U ⊆ Z: μ({σ ′ |
infA(σ
′) = U}) > 0 implies U ∈ Z . To obtain the equivalence (a)⇔(b) we now only have to note that μ({σ ′ | infA(σ ′) =
U}) > 0 iff there exists V ⊆ (S ∪ {start}) × Z with U = {z ∈ Z |∃s ∈ S : (s, z) ∈ V} andμ({σ ′ | infGA(σ ′) = V}) > 0. 
Theorem 4.3 shows that when both stopping strategies, and properties of sequences are expressed by ﬁnite automata,
then there exists a natural balance between the resources used to deﬁne a particular concept of fairness T , and the richness
of the class C for which completeness is obtained. What happens when one goes beyond ﬁnite automata? Especially, what
completeness results do we obtain for computable fairness? This is an interesting and mostly open problem. We can pose it
more pointedly by deﬁning Ccf(S) to be the set of all C ⊆ Sω such that (10) holds for all transition systems G and all μ with
support FairRun(T (S), G). The question then is for alternative characterizations of Ccf(S). We know from Theorem 4.3 that all
ω-regular C ⊆ Sω belong to Ccf(S). It is easy to construct C that are not ω-regular but also belong to Ccf(S). As the following
example shows, however, there exist limits of context-free languages which already do not belong to Ccf(S).
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Example 4.5. Let S, G be as in Example 3.3. Deﬁne L := {s ∈ {H, T}*| | {i | s [i] = H}| = | {i | s [i] = T} | }. L is a context-free
language. Let C := −→L . Now consider T = T (S), and the class M of Markov chains on G.
If a completeness held for T ,M, andC, then this, in particular,would entail the robustness propertyμ(C) = 1 ⇔ μ′(C) =
1 for all μ,μ′ ∈ M. This, however, is not the case, as we have μ(C) = 1 for μ deﬁned by transition probabilities 1/2 for all
transitions, whereasμ′(C) = 0 forμ′ deﬁned e.g. by transition probabilities p(H, T) = p(T, T) = 1/3, p(H,H) = p(T,H) =
2/3. It thus follows that the condition of computable fairness is not sufﬁcient to obtain a completeness result for limits of
context-free properties and the class of Markov chains.
5. Extending the systemmodel
5.1. Mixed models
Many previous studies considered questions of fairness and its relation to probabilistic behavior on the basis of system
models that combine probabilistic and non-deterministic behavior [3,1,24,25]. As observed by Vardi [24], these mod-
els are mostly variants of the classical Markov Decision Process model. They are appropriate e.g. for modeling the in-
teraction of a probabilistic system with a non-deterministic environment, or decisions of an agent in a probabilistic
environment.
One of the simplest and clearest model of this type are Vardi’s [24] reactive Markov chains. A reactive Markov chain is a
hybrid of a non-deterministic transition system and a probabilistic system in our sense: it is given by a set of states S, which
is partitioned into a set of non-deterministic states N, and a set of probabilistic states P. With each state s ∈ N is associated
a set t(s) ⊆ S of possible successor states, and with each state s ∈ P are associated transition probabilities p(s, s′) (s′ ∈ S, cf.
Example 3.5).
A reactiveMarkov chain can be interpreted as amodel for the interaction of a non-deterministic and a probabilistic player.
There are (at least) two different perspectives under which one can consider fairness properties of such a system, depending
on whether one wants to investigate fairness of the behavior of the non-deterministic or the probabilistic player.
If we focus on the non-deterministic player, then the question will be what kind of global system behavior can be
guaranteed by suitable fairness assumptions on the non-deterministic player, and how these relate to possible probabilistic
implementations also for the non-deterministic player. From the point of view we have adopted in this paper, a reactive
Markov chain then can be seen as a partial implementation of a fully non-deterministic system. Our deﬁnitions and results
can be relativized to such partial implementations: stopping strategies need to be restricted to only stop at non-deterministic
states (since they are needed for specifying fairness conditions for the non-deterministic player). Probabilistic systems μ
must be constrained to be consistent with the given partial implementation, i.e. must satisfy μ(s ss′ | s s) = p(s, s′) for all
s ∈ S*, s ∈ P, s′ ∈ S. Our main results Theorems 3.4 and 4.3 can be generalized to allow for such restrictions on admissible
stopping strategies and probabilistic systems (for the generalization of Theorem 4.3 one will also have to limit the run
properties C to those properties that only depend on the embedded sequence of non-deterministic states).
Alternatively, one can also focus on the probabilistic player, treat the non-deterministic player as completely unknown,
and ask, e.g. what kind of system properties can be inferred from the fairness properties of the probabilistic player (this is
the perspective adopted e.g. in [3]). Each strategy of the non-deterministic player induces a fully probabilistic system (with
0/1-valued transition probabilities—possibly history dependent—from non-deterministic states). Our results can be applied
in this setting by restricting admissible stopping strategies to only stop at probabilistic states, and by considering all possible
probabilistic systems μ obtained from possible strategies of the non-deterministic player.
Many other types of systems proposed in the literature can be reduced to the reactive Markov chain model. Pnueli &
Zuck [3], for example, use a system model in which the transition from one system state to the next is composed of three
separate moves: ﬁrst there is a non-deterministic choice of one of several available transitions (which, here, do not yet
determine the successor state, but can be thought of as a ‘transition type’ or ‘transition label’), then there is a probabilistic
choice of amode for the given transition, and ﬁnally another non-deterministic choice of an actual successor state from a set
of possible successors, which is determined by the chosen transition and mode. This model can be represented as a reactive
Markov chain by introducing explicit state representations for the three component moves of a state transition.
5.2. Inﬁnite state systems
While our basic deﬁnitions of stopping strategies and fairness could easily be extended to inﬁnite state spaces, it is
rather unclear that for inﬁnite systems they would still reﬂect reasonable and relevant conditions on system behavior (in
an inﬁnite state space one may not expect to see any states recurring inﬁnitely often, so that fairness conditions in the
form of (1) would become vacuous). However, Example 3.7 illustrates how our concepts and results can still be relevant
for an inﬁnite state system: for the purpose of a particular analysis one is often interested in a “ﬁnite state abstraction” of
an inﬁnite state space, which is obtained by grouping the inﬁnitely many states into ﬁnitely many equivalence classes. For
probabilistic systems such an abstraction will usually destroy Markov properties, i.e. an (inﬁnite state) stationary Markov
chain will induce a probabilistic system on the reduced state space that is neither Markov nor stationary (as in Example 3.7).
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It is therefore important to note that our results also include non-Markovian probabilistic systems: to some extent thismakes
them applicable to inﬁnite state systems.
6. Related work and conclusion
Connections between our results and those of Baier and Kwiatkowska [1] have already been pointed out in Section 2.2.
Varacca and Völzer [15] deﬁne fairness properties as topologically large sets of runs, and establish for ω-regular properties
a correspondence with probabilistically large sets (i.e. sets of probability 1). As in the work of Baier and Kwiatkowska, the
results areobtainedonly for-boundedprobabilistic systems.DeAlfaro [4], too,mostly considersprobabilistic systemswhose
fairness properties are determined by a global -bound on transition probabilities. Such systems are called probabilistically
fair bydeAlfaro, and it is shown that probabilistically fair systemspossess some strong and robust fairness properties (notably
invariance of fairness under synchronous composition). These results can be seen as a special instance of the right to left
direction of our Theorem 3.4.
Jurdzinski et al. [26]have investigatedconnectionsbetweenprobabilistic andnon-deterministic systems fromasomewhat
different perspective. Their main goal is to reduce certain decision problems for probabilistic games to decision problems for
non-deterministic games. The basic motivation, thus, is similar to the motivation for our study of completeness in Section 4.
However, the main issue addressed by Jurdzinski et al. [26] is not simply an elimination of probabilistic components from
the systemmodel, but the elimination of synchronous transitions: the probabilistic games considered contain simultaneous
moves by the two players, and the main problem solved by Jurdzinski et al. is the reduction to a game structure where two
players take alternating turns.
None of these previousworks have investigated the connections between fairness and the classical deﬁnitions of random-
ness, which is our ﬁrst main contribution. Furthermore, we have introduced the notion of a (T , G)-divergent probabilistic
system, which enables us to extend the analysis of fairness properties of probabilistic systems from previously studied -
bounded systems. Example 3.7 illustrates how this generalization can be useful in the analysis of inﬁnite state systems,where
global -bounds can often be an unrealistic assumption.
Our investigation was based on the simplest possible system models on the basis of which fundamental questions
concerning non-deterministic, probabilistic, and fair behavior can be studied. Beneﬁting from the simplicity of thesemodels,
we obtained very succinct proofs for our results. While some additional work is required to lift these basic results to more
complex systems models and apply them to more speciﬁc application problems in system analysis, we believe that they
capture key insights and key arguments, which can be adapted to a wide variety of more specialized contexts.
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